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Abstract 
 
The main  objective  of this  research  is to  analyze  the  effects  of  the fiscal  dimension  of  China’s 
government transfer and preferential tax policy on regional income disparity and poverty reduction. 
Using  a  computable general  equilibrium model  with  a  three-region  component,  we  find that the 
preferential tax policy on the eastern coastal region of China has a significant effect on household 
income, as well as on the FGT indicator. The simulation results suggest that tax policy is a more 
effective tool to counter against China’s regional disparity than government transfer. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
China is a large country with around 1.3 billion people and composed of 31 provinces  with 
different levels of development. Since the early 1990s, China has followed Deng Xioaping’s “let 
some  get  rich  first”  policy  and  “coastal  development  strategy”,  which  switched  the  national 
development priority from “even” to “uneven”; from “inland” to “the eastern coastal regions”. Due to 
area differences in comparative advantage and economic structure, as well as priority government 
policies directed to specific regions, the income gap widened from region to region in the past two 
decades.  Table  1  provides  some  information  on  income  disparity  among  the  country’s  three 
regions
1: eastern China
2, central China and western China. The table shows that in the 1980s, 
urban household income levels were quite similar among the regions because of the egalitarian 
income distribution system at the time. However, the pattern changed after that decade. In terms of 
household income, the ratio of eastern region to central region to western region increased from 
1.20:1:1.18 in 1981 to 1.50:1:1.10 in 2001 in urban areas. At the same time, the ratio across the 
regions’ rural areas increased from 1.25:1:0.91 in 1981 to 1.64:1:0.76 in 2001. The regional gap 
either in urban or in rural areas widened in the 1990s, and the regional income disparity in rural 
areas was larger than that in the urban areas. 
From  2001  to  2005,  with  China  adopting  a  “western  region  development  strategy”,  the  gap 
between  the  central  region  and  eastern  region  became  wider,  while  the  disparity  between  the 
central and western was smaller than it was previously. For example, in terms of urban household 
income level, while the ratio of eastern region to central region increased from 1.50:1 in 2001 to 
1.55:1 in 2005, the ratio of central to western region decreased from 1:1.10 in 2001 to 1:1.01 in 
2005. 
A recent comparison among the eastern, central and western regions shows that per capita 
GDP of western and central China accounted for 40.7 percent and 52.2 percent, respectively of that 
in eastern China. In terms of per capita consumption expenditure, the numbers are 57.6 percent and 
69.6 percent, respectively in 2001. 
                                                            
1 China is composed of the following provinces: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and 
Xinjiang. 
2 The country’s eastern region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Shandong,  Guangdong,  Guangxi,  and  Hainan.  Its  central  region  includes  Shanxi,  Inner  Mongolia,  Jilin, 
Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan. Finally, the western region consists of Chongqing, 
Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang.   3
 
Table 1: Regional disparities: per capita income of urban household and rural household unit: 
RMB, in current price 


























































































































Source: Calculated from “China Statistical Yearbook”, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2006.  
 
Increasing income disparity has resulted in high poverty rates in the central and western areas 
of China, where the poor population is most concentrated and the degree of poverty is the most 
serious. In 2000, only 10 percent
3 of the poor population is distributed in the eastern region. The 
figure is 28 percent in the central region and 62 percent in the western region. 
Why has the disparity in poverty across China’s regions widened in the past 20 years? Aside 
from regional comparative advantages, can China’s tax preferential policy and government transfers 
– which have been implemented in the past 20 years – be considered as the main reasons for the 
pattern of disparity? These are the core questions that we try to answer in this study. The paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the determinants of China’s regional disparity. Section 3 
is a review of existing literature on the subject, while section 4 looks at the CGE framework used to 
simulate policy shocks on China’s regional disparity and poverty. Section 5 reports the simulation 
results while section 6 concludes the study. 
                                                            
3 The Rural Research Office of National Statistics Bureau, “A Monitoring Report on China’s Rural Poverty” 
(2001). Note: Definition of eastern region, central region and western region is little different from the regions 
as described in Table 1.   4
 
2.  Determinants of  China’s  regional disparity 
 
2.1 Factor market distortion and initial conditions 
Factor market distortion and differences in some initial economic conditions at the beginning of 
the economic reform, including physical and human capital stocks, could be the first determinant 
that contributes to China’s regional disparity. Advantageous geographic factors in China’s coastal 
regions
4 reduce transportation and communication costs, which in turn attract more foreign direct 
investments and migrant labor
5. Besides, China’s labor market distortion such as the Hukou system
6 
is also widely considered as one of the reasons for regional disparity
7. Due to immobility of labor 
across  geographical  areas,  less  developed  regions  cannot  get  the  needed  technicians  and 
specialists to upgrade the technologies and improve managerial capabilities in these areas. On the 
other hand, developed regions cannot get the needed unskilled labor to lower their costs in some 
industries,  which  in  turn  can  bring  relative  technical  advantages  these  unskilled  laborers  have 
learned to less developed regions.  
2.2  China’s centralized price management system 
The second determinant is China’s centralized price management system. There is a significant 
difference  in  industrial  structure  between  China’s  eastern  coastal  region  and  its  interior  region 
mainly because of their respective natural resource advantages. Manufacturing is the backbone 
industry for eastern China, while mining is a key industry for the interior region because of its rich 
mineral  resources.  From  1979,  although  economic  reform  had  already  been  implemented,  the 
prevailing  price  management  system  was  still    highly  controlled  by  government.  Under  these 
circumstances,  the  price  for  raw  materials  and  natural  resources  was  set  much  lower  than  the 
market price, while the price for manufacturing products was set higher than the products in the 
market system.  This distorted price system makes the eastern region benefit from both buying the 
raw material and from selling the manufactured products, while the central and western regions – 
which are in China’s interior – get penalized twice over. Similarly, agricultural goods also subsidize 
the manufacturing goods through this pricing system, and this is also one of the reasons for the 
disparity between China’s rural and urban areas.  
                                                            
4 Most provinces and cities in the eastern region are actually located in China’s coastal region.  
5 See Demurger et al.(Demurger et al., 2002) and Yao and Zhang (Yao and Zhang, 2001). 
6 Hukou refers to the system of residency permits which dates back to the early 1950s, where household 
registration  is required by  law in China.  A household registration record officially  identifies a person as a 
resident of an area and includes identifying information such as the name of the person, date of birth, parents’ 
names, and name of spouse, if married. In China’s labor market, Hukou is crucial for people to get a job. For 
example, if someone wants to get a job offered in Beijing, he must have a Beijing Hukou, otherwise he cannot 
get the job even though he is qualified. 
7 See Cai etc. (Cai, Wang &Du, 2002 ), Lin,Wang, and Zao (Lin,Wang and Zao, 2004)   5
2.3      Policies relevant to regional disparity
8 
2.3.1  China’s regional development strategies 
China’s post-reform regional development strategies comprise another factor that contributed 
directly to its widening income variations. As early as 1980, China formally established four special 
economic zones located in the coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. In 1984, another 14 
coastal cities were opened in order to attract foreign direct investment and trade.  
These special economic zones and open coastal areas had considerable autonomy, enjoyed 
special  tax  treatments,  and  received  preferential  resource  allocations.  As  part  of  the  country’s 
Coastal  Area  Development  Strategy,  the  government  gradually  extended  special  policies  to  all 
coastal areas in the late 1980s. Although some cities in the interior regions were eventually opened 
in 1994, the time lag had varied effects on attracting investments and generating growth, putting the 
non-coastal provinces at a significant disadvantage. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
coastal  provinces garnered  a  disproportionately  high  share  of foreign  investment  and  trade  and 
became the cradle of rural enterprises, which have been the driving force behind China’s income 
growth. During this period, the income levels of interior and coastal regions diverged. 
2.3.2   Preferential taxation policy for eastern coastal regions from 1990 to 2000 
Following the “let some get rich first” strategy at the onset of the reform program, the central 
government  granted  preferential  treatment  to  coastal  regions  with  respect  to  foreign  direct 
investment (FDI) and taxation. In particular, while state-owned enterprises paid their income tax at 
33 percent, foreign enterprises paid only 15 percent on average. These policies resulted in a rapid 
income convergence among coastal regions that were allowed to integrate with the outside world. 
However, the policies also caused regional disparity in terms of volume of FDI inflows and other 
types of private investment. Until 2005, FDIs in the eastern region comprised about 87 percent of 
China’s total FDI, while the central and western regions only made up 9 percent and 4 percent, 
respectively of this total. Besides, collective investment in the coastal region comprised 74.6 percent 
of China’s total investment in 1997, while the central and western regions only accounted for 25.4 
percent of such investment. These private investments greatly promoted the effectiveness and the 
production structure of the enterprises located in the coastal region, and thus increased the level of 
development of different regions. 
2.3.3   Preferential taxation policy for western regions from 2000 to 2005 
As previously mentioned, preferential policies widened the income disparity between the coastal 
                                                            
8 Yang (2002) emphasized fiscal and credit policies and a regional development strategy as the main causes 
of rising regional inequality in China. On the other hand, Kanbur and Zhang (2002) showed empirical evidence 
that fiscal centralization and trade liberalization have also systematically affected regional inequality. Besides, 
as a component of government transfers, an urban price subsidy and government subsidies to unprofitable 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) based in urban centers, as well as preferential credit allocations to the state 
sector also contributed significantly to the increase in the rural–urban household income gap (Yang and Cai, 
2000).   6
and western regions from 1990 to 2000.  
To reduce this gap, government started to adjust the regional allocation structure of its poverty 
relief fund in 1994, and to formulate preferential policies to actively promote balanced development 
between  the  eastern  and  western  regions.  This  was  achieved  by  offering  tax  concessions  and 
exemptions  of  three  and  two  years,  respectively,  to  local  joint  ventures  and  foreign-owned 
enterprises, as well as to key investment projects in the western region. In 2001, as a means of 
spurring enterprise in the western region, income taxes were reduced to 15 percent for the next 10 
years for firms in the tourism and banking sectors. 
2.3.4    Transfer payments  
Transfer payments
9 have continued to play an important role in China’s state budget, serving as 
the most important tool to deal with regional disparity and poverty.  However, most of the transfers 
are merely a redistribution of tax revenues between the central and local governments as a result of 
the  tax  sharing  system  enforced  during  the  1980s  and  1990s
10.  Transfer  payments  aimed  at 
reducing  the  regional  disparity  were  initiated  after  1994,  when  the  central  government  applied 
transitional measures such as fiscal transfer payments to the central and western areas. At that time 
however, the country had not yet reached the goal of an ideal tax-sharing system i.e., increasing 
fiscal transfers to balance public finance among regions. As a consequence of such a premature 
system, rich regions rather than poor regions received more transfers in the form of returned tax 
revenues. Only a very small proportion of the transfer aimed to reduce the regional disparities.  
Table 2 shows the structure of China’s government transfer in the years 1997, 2000, 2002 and 
2006, in which tax rebates plus specific purpose grants that favored the eastern region make up 
approximately 80 percent of total government transfers.  
Transitional measures, which is the only type of transfer arrangement that aims to narrow the 
regional gap, accounts for a small part of the total transfer as shown in the table. The total amounts 
of this type of transfer payment to the central and western regions are, respectively, double and 
triple the transfer payment to the eastern regions after year 2000.  
Due  to  the  transition  transfer’s  small  share  relative  to  the  total  transfer,  the  effect  of  the 
government transfer on regional disparity is regarded as inconsequential. However, as a tool for 
equalizing regional gaps, the Chinese government plans to gradually increase the transfer to the 
central and western regions in the future. 
                                                            
9 In  the  existing  fiscal  system,  transfer  payment  items  from  the  central  government  to  local  governments 
include tax refunds, fixed subsidies of the original system, transfer payments, and funds raised by government 
bonds. 
10 During the 1980s and 1990s, China’s fiscal system was decentralized so that regional governments were 
required to finance their local development initiatives themselves.   7
Table 2:   Structure of government transfer unit in billion RMB and % 
  1997  %  2000  %  2002  % 
Total   285.4  100  466.8  100  824.0  100 
Tax rebates  201.2  70.5  220.7  54.4  301.4  36.6 
Quota subsidies  11.2  3.9      32.3  3.9 
Specific purpose grants  51.6  18.1  89.9  22.2  402.5  48.8 
Transitional measures  5.0  1.8  8.5  2.1     
Final account subsidies  11.1  3.9         
Others (residual)  5.4  1.9         
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
3    Literature review 
The  link  between  fiscal  policy  and  income  distribution  is  one  of  the  central  questions  of 
economic development. A number of approaches have been done to analyze this link; including the 
crafting of suitable tools to assess the impact of fiscal policies i.e. changes in trade or tax policies, 
on poverty and income distribution.  
Among the variety of policy analysis tools, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are 
widely used because of their ability to illustrate the feedback effect between different markets, and 
produce  disaggregated  results  at  the  sectoral  or  microeconomic  level  within  a  consistent 
macroeconomic  framework  (Piggott  and  Whalley,  1985;  De  Janvry,  Sadoulet  et  Fargeix,  1991; 
Adelman and Robinson, 1988; Dervis et al., 1982;  Bourguignon and al., 1991; De Janvry and al., 
1991; Decaluwé, Dumont and Savard 1999; Cogneau and Robillard, 2000; Cockburn, J., 2001). 
Among  the  varied  applications  of  CGE  models,  regional  CGEs  can  be  used  to  geographically 
disaggregate the impact of state-wide economic policies, as well as regional development policies 
such as area-targeted transfer, tax policy, and local-based public spending. 
Early studies on regional CGE models focused on simulating trade policy shocks. Dixon et al. 
(1982) presented a top-down regional disaggregation of the effects of tariff increases in Australia; 
Liew (1984) used a bottom-up approach to compare the effects of a tariff increase in Australia with 
the results achieved in a top-down framework; Whalley and Trela (1986) reported results from an 
interregional CGE model for the regional impacts of tariffs in Canada; and Gazel (1994) developed 
an inter-regional CGE model to measure the regional effects of the Free Trade Agreement between 
the US and Canada. 
Mathur and Stein (1993) expanded the CGE framework to a dynamic setting by allowing for 
sluggish interregional adjustment processes.  In 1998, using a regional CGE model, Dalenberg, 
Partridge  and  Rickman  (1997)  found  that  taxes  used  to  finance  increased  public  infrastructure 
investment led to increased state employment growth in the United States.    8
Some recent extensions to the early regional CGE literature include Seung and Kraybill (2001), 
and Conrad and Heng (2002). Both of these studies examined the role of public infrastructure in 
regional economic growth. They found that even when accounting for negative effects of increased 
taxes  to  finance  public  infrastructure,  the  reduced  congestion  increased  regional  output. 
Characterized by using “supra-regional “ accounts as well as a consumer’s or buyer’s price in the 
model,  Bernard  Decaluwé  et  al.  (2002)  built  a  bi-region  CGE  (Québec  and  Rest-of-Canada)  to 
mimic provincial and federal government policy shocks on the two economies. 
Using an innovative technique developed by Decaluwe, Patry, Savard, and Thorbecke (1999), 
poverty analysis is integrated into the CGE methodology to allow for the endogenous determination 
of both the intra-group income distributions and the monetary poverty line. By applying standard 
poverty measures, national poverty lines, and distributions of income for each household group to 
the simulation,  policy-induced  changes  in group-specific  and  national poverty  can  be  evaluated. 
They showed that an important contribution of the dual-dual model vis-à-vis poverty analysis in a 
CGE  model  is  its  incorporation  of  inter-group  migration.  They  also  found  that  the  changing 
population  shares  of  the  socio-economic  groups  that  follow  population  shifts  have  important 
implications for the magnitude of changes in national poverty.  
In general, CGE models can quantify income distribution effects in two key ways. One is in 
terms of returns to factors of production, where the households own the factors of production, which 
is given to firms; in return, factors of income are given for their services.  
The other is to model more than one household rather than only one representative household. 
As regards relevant CGE studies on China, the model includes several types of households and 
results of these can be found in Yang and Huang (1997), Wang and Zhai (1998), Li and Zhai (2000), 
and Zhai and Hertel (2000).  
Due to the unavailability of official regional data such as commodity inflow and outflow among 
regions, only a few CGE studies have been done to consider the regional situation within China 
upon its adoption of fiscal policy. Li and He (Li and He, 2005) apply a regional CGE model
11   to 
simulate trade and environmental policy shocks (such as reduction of CO2  emissions) on human 
health and other environmental end-points like crop and material damage. Horridge, J.M. and G. 
Wittwer (2008, 2009) establish a “bottom-up” computable general equilibrium model of the Chinese 
economy to analyze the regional economic impacts of region-specific shocks. 
In this paper, we develop a three-region (western China, eastern China and central China) CGE 
model that maintains the characteristics of a CGE model while also highlighting the linkage between 
the CGE and FGT indicator. 
                                                            
11 This model is created by the Development Research Centre (DRC). It is a three-region (Guangdong, Shanxi, 
and rest of China) CGE model; the earlier version was a two-region model.   9
4.  Analytical framework  
The three-region CGE model that serves as the analytical framework for this study has a similar 
structure to Cockburn’s model. The difference lies in that, rather than looking at tariff, we focus on 
the effect of China’s preferential tax policy and government transfer on poverty.  
To address the issue of regional disparity, we divide China into eastern China, central China and 
western China for the following reasons. Firstly, China’s preferential tax policy was implemented by 
these three regions in different years. The second reason is the availability of data. Although China 
has 31 provinces and autonomous regions, not all have their own input-output (I-O) table. These 
tables  and  data  are  created  and  compiled  by  the  Department  of  Statistics  for  each  province 
separately. The Social Sciences Academic Press published China’s first “Multi-regional Input-Output 
Model”  until  2005.  This  I-O  table  divides  China  into  eight  regions,  from  which  we  can  easily 
construct  regional I-O tables for the aforementioned regions. However, China’s multi-regional input-
output model is not a standard social accounting matrix (SAM). For a CGE model, we needed to 
create a SAM based on an I-O table and some statistical data such as tax rate and regional labor 
data. These data are normally reported by the three regions highlighted in this study.  
Similar  considerations  are  also  taken  into  account  when  we  selected  the  sectors  and 
households for the study. The eight sectors are agriculture, mining industry, light industry, heavy 
industry, power industry, construction, trade and transportation industry, and other service sectors. 
We also included the rural and urban households in each region. 
4.1 Macro CGE framework 
Similar to the conventional CGE model, our model also describes the behavior of three agents: 
the  producer,  the  consumer,  and  government.    The  representative  producer  in  each  region 
maximizes  profit  by  optimally  using  composite  factors  and  inputs,  given  their  market  prices.  By 
producing the most profitable combination of goods and services, their products are sold in the 
domestic market and exported to the rest of the world by constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
function  given  the  different  market  prices.    Consumers  or  individual  households  in  each  region 
receive income from the firm and other sources such as government transfers, and then consume 
goods  and  services  according  to  maximized  utility.  The  government  collects  taxes  and  also 
consumes. Prices and wages are determined to clear commodity and factor markets.  
The  model  consists  of eight  blocks:  price,  firm  behavior,  household  behavior,  government 
behavior, trade, investment demand, and general equilibrium condition. The core equations of firm 
behavior, household behavior, government behavior, trade demand, and calibration of poverty index 
are explained as follows. The function related to the poverty issue FGT is separated from the CGE 
model.   10
The  output  function  is  set  up  according  to  national  and  regional  levels.  Firstly,  the  national 
sectoral  output  is  a  CES  composite  of  sectoral  output  by  region.  Regional  sectoral  output  is  a 
Leontief function of value-added and the intermediate input of each sector. Sectoral value-added by 
region is a CES composite of primary factors. Sectoral output is sold in the domestic market and is 
exported in the international market through the CET function. 
In  many  CGE  models,  representative  household  expenditure  behavior  functions  are  derived 
from the maximization of the Cobb-Douglas or constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility. The 
limitation in using these functional forms for consumption is that they imply unitary income elasticity 
of demand. This fails to account for the way changes in income affect the structural adjustment of 
the economy to exogenous shocks. In order to avoid such drawbacks in our model, consumption 
demand is determined by using the utility function associated with the linear expenditure system 
(LES).  Income  of  rural  or  urban  households  in  different  regions  is  the  sum  of  wage  income  of 
unskilled labor or skilled labor, return to capital, and government transfer. After paying income tax, 
the household uses disposable income to save and to consume. 
Similar to the definition of conventional government consumption, in this model government gets 
income from taxes such as capital income tax, household income tax, export taxes, tariffs, value-
added taxes, and indirect taxes. The government consumption function is simplified as a proportion 
function  of  the  total  output.  Except  consumption,  government  transfer  to  the  firms,  transfer  to 
households, and transfer to the rest of the world are also recorded as government expenditure. 
Total  national  domestic  demand  includes  household  consumption,  government  consumption, 
intermediate input demand, and investment demand, which have been discussed above.  
The closure rules are defined by a set of constraints that need to be satisfied by the economic 
system. These constraints are as follows: (1) the supply-demand balances in the product; (2) the 
equilibrium in factor markets (which means that  labor is mobile between sectors but fixed and fully 
employed within each region; and  capital is fixed within each sector and region); (3) the fiscal 
balance,  showing  that  investment  is  determined  by  total  saving;  and  (4)  the  external  balance, 
equating the supply and demand for foreign exchange.  
 
4.2   Functions related to the poverty issue 
Following  Cockburn’s  (2001)  method,  we  calculate  FGT  index  to  mimic  the  policy  shock  on 
poverty.  
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where j is a sub-group of individuals with income below the poverty line (z), N is the total number 
of adult equivalents in the sample, yj is the income of the individual j and α is a parameter that 
allows us to distinguish between the alternative FGT indices.  
 
5.  Simulation Results 
 
First, we assume that China’s preferential taxation policy is one of the reasons for its regional 
disparity and expect that if the preferential taxation policy is eliminated, regional disparity in the 
country  can  be  improved.    Since the main  premise  of  the  preferential  taxation  policy  is  to give 
income tax reduction to specific firms such as FDI enterprises and other private enterprises, we 
need to eliminate the preferential tax to these specific enterprises and then calculate its effects.  
However, since the regional data decomposed by types of firms and by sectors are not available 
for each region, what we did was to take into account the share of different types of firms to total in 
each sector and each region.  Using value-added output data from the yearbook, we find that 84.0 
percent
12 of FDI firms and private firms were located in the eastern region in 1997; in other words, 
there are almost no FDI enterprises in the central and western regions.  
In our simulation, we wanted to show that if the preferential taxation for the eastern region is 
eliminated, and the firm income tax rate is the same as that of the central and western regions, then 
the selling price for the products produced in the eastern region will increase. This will then change 
the output in the three regions as well as government revenue, which will in turn change household 
income and consumption. The resulting income and consumption effects will, in turn, feed back into 
the  model  and  influence  the  overall  results.  For  this  consideration,  we  begin  with  the  initial 
preferential  tax  rates  for  the  eastern  region  and  trace  the  impacts  of  eliminating  this  kind  of 
preferential tax for the eastern region through the model. 
To simulate the effect of this kind of policy, we need the actual enterprise income tax rate for 
foreign investment enterprises and other private-type enterprises. In the model file (see Appendix 
1), the variable is  ir tkk , which is also the shock variable in our simulation for preferential tax policy. 
Due to lack of relative data by region, by type of enterprise (i.e. state-owned or privately-owned) and 
by sectors, we considered two exercises to simulate the effects of preferential taxation. The first 
involved simply using the change in the nominal enterprise income tax, which is 15 percent (given 
that 30% is the non-preferential tax rate while 15% is the preferential rate), since we do not know 
the actual preferential tax rate for FDIs and other private enterprises by region and sector. This 
simulation may result in a bigger shock than what is seen in reality.  
                                                            
12 Figures are calculated by the authors using 1997 provincial investment data.    12
The  second  exercise  is  trying  to  mimic  the  change  in  actual  preferential  tax  rate.  In  1997, 
China’s total FDI by sector is accounted for as follows: 1.89 percent by agriculture, 0.39 percent by 
mining  industry,  63.85  percent  by  manufacturing  industry,  1.1  percent  by  power  industry,  2.05 
percent by construction, 2.82 percent by trade and 29.95 percent by other service sector.  In terms 
of FDI by region, 84.0 percent flowed into the eastern region, while the western and central regions 
received  only  16  percent  of  total  FDI  combined;  we  thus  assumed  that  foreign  investment 
enterprises are just located in the eastern region. These FDI enterprises produced 23.29 percent of 
the  total  output  in  the  eastern  region,  which  we  needed  to  take  into  account  in  the  following 
calculation.  In  the  second  exercise  therefore,  we  computed  a  0  percent  change  in  agriculture, 
mining, power, and construction sectors; and a 3.49 percent (23.29%*15%) in the manufacturing 
sector,  light  and  heavy  manufacturing  industries,  the  trade  sector,  and  services  in  the  eastern 
region.  
We then examined if China’s current government transfer - which is represented in our model as 
TGH (see Appendix 1) - is an effective tool to narrow the regional disparity.  
Similar to the first simulation, we initialed the government transfer the same as that in 1997, then 
we  increased  the  government  transfer  to  the  central  and  western  regions  by  37.8  percent
13.  
Theoretically, more government transfers increase government expenditure to the household, thus 
increasing household income as a result. The household income and consumption effects will feed 
back into the model and influence the overall results.  
Table 3 presents sectoral supply and demand effects under scenario 1. From the simulation 
results,  we  find  that  when  enterprise  income  tax  increases  in  the  eastern  region’s  light 
manufacturing,  heavy  manufacturing,  trade,  and  service  sectors,  the  output  for  domestic  use 
decreases in four sectors, while the output in mining, power, trade and transportation, and services 
sectors increase. The reason for such is that when the capital income tax increases in the sector, 
prices for the products from that sector increase, thus decreasing product demand, especially for 
light manufacturing and heavy manufacturing products. However, if the product is labor-intensive, 
demand for capital rises with the increase in product price, which may in turn result in increasing 
rather than decreasing demand. This could also explain why the demand for the service product 
increases when we increase the tax rate in the service sector in the eastern region, as noted in table 
3. The imports and exports have the same pattern as domestic demand.  
                                                            
13 Average  nominal  growth  rate  of  government  transfers  during  1997-2002  is  37.8  percent.    In  terms  of 
government transfer categories, only transition transfers aim at eliminating regional disparity, especially in the 
central and western regions.    13
 
Table 3: Effect on total supply and total demand, export and import unit in% 
 
  Eliminating preferential tax policy to eastern 
region by 15%
14 
Eliminating preferential tax policy to eastern 
region by 3.49% 
Total supply  Total demand  Total supply  Total demand 
  Domestic  
market 
export  Domestic  
demand 
import  domestic 
market 
export  domestic 
produced 
import 
Agriculture  -0.100  -0.133  -0.100  -0.068  -0.026  -0.034  -0.026  -0.018 
Mining  -0.121  -0.149  -0.121  -0.094  -0.031  -0.038  -0.031  -0.024 
Light industry  -0.062  -0.109  -0.062  -0.015  -0.016  -0.028  -0.016  -0.004 
Heavy industry  -0.193  -0.227  -0.193  -0.158  -0.050  -0.059  -0.050  -0.041 
Power  0.192  0.010  0.192  0.092  0.013  0.003  0.013  0.024 
Construction  -0.470  -0.501  -0.470  -0.440  -0.121  -0.129  -0.121  -0.114 
Trade and 
transportation 
0.780  0.686  0.780  0.875  0.202  0.178  0.202  0.226 
services  0.197  0.143  0.197  0.251  0.051  0.037  0.051  0.065 
 
However, when we examine the government transfer exercises (see Table 4) we find that an 
increase in government transfers to the central and western regions will increase the domestic sales 
in four sectors, with the agriculture sector having the biggest positive effect. The heavy industry, 
construction,  trade  and  transportation,  and  services  sectors  respond  negatively,  with  services 
having the biggest negative effect among these sectors. 
                                                            
14 This treatment equals to an increase in the FDI enterprise income tax.   14
Table 4:  Effect on total supply and total demand, export and import unit in % 
  Increasing government transfer to central and 
western region by 37.8% 
Increasing government transfer to 
central and 
western region by 50% 
Total supply  Total demand  Total supply  Total demand 
  domestic 
market 
export  Domestic  
demand 
import  domestic 
market 
Export  domestic 
produced 
import 
Agriculture  0.223  0.248  0.223  0.210  0.303  0.328  0.303  0.278 
Mining  0.008  0.031  0.008  -0.015  0.011  0.042  0.011  -0.019 
Light industry  0.055  0.075  0.055  0.035  0.072  0.099  0.072  0.046 
Heavy industry  -0.017  0.002  -0.017  -0.036  -0.022  0.003  -0.022  -0.048 
Power  0.003  0.018  0.003  -0.012  0.004  0.023  0.004  -0.016 
Construction  -0.097  -0.078  -0.097  -0.116  -0.129  -0.103  -0.129  -0.154 
Trade and 
transportation 
-0.558  -0.505  -0.558  -0.611  -0.738  -0.668  -0.738  -0.808 
services  -0.015  -0.003  -0.015  -0.028  -0.029  -0.003  -0.029  -0.037 
 
Table 5 reports some results of breaking down the value-added output by region and sector so 
that we could find regional effects. With the increasing enterprise income tax in some sectors in the 
eastern region, value-added output increases in power, trade and transportation and service, and 
decreases in the light and heavy manufacturing industries, agriculture, mining, and construction. 
Since the pattern is the same as the change in domestic demand and supply as shown in table 3, 
we could explain the results in the same way as cited previously.  
Table 5:  Sectoral value-added output effects in different region unit, in %  
  Eliminating preferential tax policy to 
eastern region by 15% 
Eliminating preferential tax policy to eastern 
region by 3.49% 










Agriculture  -0.101  -0.098  -0.102  -0.026  -0.025  -0.026 
Mining  -0.129  -0.125  -0.118  -0.033  -0.032  -0.031 
Light industry  -0.066  -0.070  -0.071  -0.017  -0.018  -0.018 
Heavy industry  -0.196  -0.198  -0.196  -0.051  -0.051  -0.051 
Power  0.041  0.048  0.056  0.011  0.012  0.015 
















services  0.178  0.219  0.182  0.046  0.057  0.047   15
As we had expected in the beginning of this study, the outcome of government transfers as 
shown  in  table  6  has  weak  effects  on  value-added  output  when  compared  with  the  effect  of 
preferential taxation policy, and this result has been tested in previous research i.e. Zhang, 2005 (in 
Chinese). 
Table 6: Sectoral value-added output effects in different region unit in % 
  Increasing government transfer to 
central and 
western region by 37.8% 
Increasing government transfer to  
central and 
western region by 50% 












Agriculture  0.254  0.226  0.215  0.336  0.299  0.285 
Mining  0.033  0.010  -0.006  0.044  0.013  -0.008 
Light industry  0.067  0.060  0.054  0.088  0.079  0.071 
Heavy industry  -0.001  -0.014  -0.020  -0.002  -0.019  -0.026 
Power  0.03  0.008  -0.012  0.040  0.011  -0.016 
Construction  -0.083  -0.096  -0.105  -0.110  -0.128  -0.139 
Trade and 
transportation  -0.512  -0.564  -0.564  -0.677  -0.746  -0.746 
services  0.020  -0.020  -0.026  0.027  -0.026  -0.034 
Policy effects on household income are the major concern of our report. Tables 7 and 8 note the 
simulation results on change in household income. When we eliminated the preferential tax policy in 
the eastern region, we find that all households have a positive response in terms of household 
income. Since household income is sourced from factor returns and government transfers in our 
model, if capital income tax increases to some degree, household income may in turn increase. 
Besides, from table 7 we learn that households in the western and central regions have bigger 
positive  response  than  that  of  households  in  the  eastern  region,  which  may  mean  that  if  the 
preferential tax treatment is eliminated, the income gap between different household groups will be 
smaller.  Similar to the above simulation results, a smaller change in tax rate results in a smaller 
response, but the pattern of the change remains the same. 
Table 7:  Effects on household income unit in % 
    Eliminating preferential tax 
policy to eastern region by 15% 
Eliminating preferential tax policy to 
eastern region by 3.49% 
Eastern region  Rural household  0.048  0.013 
  Urban household  0.048  0.013 
Central region  Rural household  0.059  0.015 
  Urban household  0.059  0.015 
Western region  Rural household  0.058  0.015 
  Urban household  0.058  0.015 
   16
In  scenario  2,  when government  transfers to  households  in  the  central  and  western  regions 
increase by 37.8 percent and 50 percent, respectively (see Table 8),  household income for all six 
types  of  households  increase,  with  households  in  the  eastern  region  registering  the  smallest 
increase,  while  households  in  the  western  region  increase  the  most.  Since  we  assume  that 
household  income  comes  from  government  transfers,  the  income  will  thus  increase  with  more 
transfer payments. 
Table 8:  Effects on household income unit in % 
    Increasing government 
transfer to central and 
western region by 37.8% 
Increasing government transfer to 
central and western region by 
50% 
       
Eastern region  Rural household  0.024  0.032 


















  Urban household  0.080  0.106 
 
 
In terms of welfare, the Hicksian EV decreases by 0.041 percent, 0.07 percent, 0.016 percent 
and 0.017 percent under the above scenarios. The consumer price increase in all the cases is 
shown in table 9.  
Table 9: Change in consumer price unit in % 
  Eliminating 
preferential tax 
policy to eastern 
region by 15% 
Eliminating 
preferential tax policy 




to central and 




transfer to central 
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Finally, following Cockburn (2001), we calculate the FGT poverty index using the household 
data sourced from NBS in 1997 and DAD software. Table 10 reports the results.  
 
Table 10: Change in FGT poverty index (%) 




Eliminating preferential tax policy to 
eastern region by 15% 
Increasing government transfer to 




























Poverty gap (α= 1)  -0.067    -0.223    -0.454      -0.035    -0.213  -0.273 
Poverty severity (α= 2)  -0.043  -0.101  -0.176  -0.012  -0.063  -0.0682 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Given that the fight against poverty has significant positive effects on the welfare of the whole 
society,  it  is  thus  an  unavoidable  obligation  of  government  to  implement  poverty-alleviation 
strategies.  As has been illustrated in this paper, anti-poverty strategies employed in China since the 
middle of the 1980s have been characterized as regionalistic, beginning with the preferential tax 
policy given to the eastern coastal region from the end of 1970s up to western region development 
strategies from the start of this century.   
Using some statistical data and a computable general equilibrium model with a three- region 
component, we find that a preferential tax policy to a specific region could be an important reason 
for China’s regional disparity and could have a significant effect on household income as well as 
FGT indicators. On the other hand, government transfers have similar - and in some cases, weaker 
- effects on both household incomes and FGT indicators. The simulation results suggest that a tax 
policy is a relatively more effective tool against China’s regional disparity more than government 
transfers.  
To effectively use government transfers against poverty, the Chinese government should either 
need to use more money for transferring to the country’s poor regions and people, or change its old 
transfer structure in order to really benefit its poor. Other transfer-related strategies that are also 
being  implemented  include  reforms  in  the  pension  system,  social  insurance  system,  and 
employment system to protect the low-income population and those living in rural areas. Regional 
disparity  and  the  poverty  problem  are expected to  be  addressed  in this regard,  in the  name of 
China’s “harmonious society”.    18
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Following is the structure of production as has been described above.  





















i =  Agriculture,  Mining industry,  Light industry,  Heavy industry,  Power industry,  Construction,  
trade and transportation,  Other service sectors 
 
h =  rural households in eastern China,  
rural household in western China,  
rural household in central China 
urban households in eastern China,  
urban household in western China,  
urban household in central China 
Total sectoral output: 
CES composite  
















composite of  capital, 










composite of  capital, 
skilled labor and 
unskilled labor 
Value-added: CES 
composite of  capital, 
skilled labor and 
unskilled labor   21
  
f = Capital, Unskilled labor, Skilled labor  
 
r = eastern China, western China, central China 
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in which,    XSTi :  Total output of sector  
                   XSir :  Sector output in region r  
y
i ir i r d b , ,   are parameters 
 
Regional sectoral output   
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in which,   VAir : Variable sector production cost in region r 
                  vir : Leontief coefficient of value-added in region r 
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where, Pir : price for product i in region r. 
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in which,   KTir : capital demand in region r 
                     LDir : labor demand in region r 
v
ir ir r j a , ,  are parameters 
 
Total labor demand 
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in which,   RRir : capital price in region r 
                     Wir : labor price in region r 
v
i ir s j , :  parameters 
ir tkk : capital income tax rate 
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in which,   LDQir : skilled labor demand in region r 
                 WNQr : unskilled labor price in region r 
WQr : skilled labor price in region r 
LDNQir : unskilled labor demand in region r 
L
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in which,   ICJijr : intermediate input in region r 
   ICjr : intermediate input in region r 
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in which, io ir : coefficient 
 
domestic market supply and  export to international market 
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in which:  Di : local market sales  
    EXi: sales at international market  
   PEi: Price of goods for export  
                  PDi: Price of goods sold at home region 
t t cet cet s r d b , , , ,γi  : parameters 
      
 
Household behavior block 
 
 
Household consumption function 
 
) * ( h h h
h
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h ∑ - + =                 (13) 
in which, CHh: consumption of  households in region r 
                PCh: consumer price in region r 
                CTHh: disposable income of households in region r 
      h h : minimum subsistence requirements for households in region r 
      h m : marginal propensity to consume for households in region r 
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          (14) 
 
in which,  YHh: households income 
                 divh: dividend to the household 
                 PINDEX: price index 
                 TGHh: government transfer to the household 
                 E:  exchange rate 
                 TRH: foreign transfer payment to household 
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Household disposable income function 
 
Household disposable income is household income minus income tax of the household. 
) 1 ( h h h ty YH YDH - =                                     (15) 
in which, YDH h: household disposable income 
                  h ty : household income tax rate 
 
Household consumption expenditure function 
 
h h h SH YDH YTH - =                                       (16) 
 
in which, SH h: household savings 
 
Dividend transfer to household 
 
                                       (17) 
in which,  h DIV : dividend transfer to household 
                 h dvr : share of dividend to capital income 
                 YK: capital income 
 
Firm  income function 
 
E TRF TGF PINDEX YK YF * * + + =            (18) 
In which, YF:  firm income 
                TGF:  government transfer to firm 
                TRF:  foreign payments transfer to firm 
 






hr KT rr YK * ) 1 ( ∑ ∑ ∑ - = g                                  (19) 
 
Firm  saving  function 
 
TFR E div YF tk SF
h
h * * ) 1 ( - - - = ∑                   ( 20 ) 
in which, tk:  firm income tax  
 
Government behavior block 
 
 government total spending function 
 
YK dvr DIV h h * =  25
i i PC CG CTG * ∑ =                                               (21) 
 
in which, CTG :  government total expenditure 
CGi : government consumption in region r 
             
 government consumption function 
 
i i i Q CG * w =                                                          (22) 
 in which :    ωi: The share of government consumption in output   
 
 government revenue function 
 










h TXE TXM TXS TVA TRG E YK TK TXY YG * *       
(23) 
in which, YG: government revenue 
        TXYh: household income taxes 
                TVAi: value-added taxes 
                TXS ir: indirect taxes 
                TXM i: import duties 
                TXE i: export taxes 
 
 
Household income taxes 
 
  h h h YH ty TXY * =                                               (24) 
 
Value-added  taxes 
 
) * * ( ir
r
ir i VA PVA TV TVA ∑ =                                            (25) 
Indirect  taxes 
 
ir ir ir ir XS P tx TXS * * ) ( =                                                    （26） 
Import  duties 
 
i i i i IM E PWM tm TXM * * * ) ( 0 =                                      （27）   26
 
Export  taxes 
 
i i i i ES PE te TXE * * ) ( =                                                     （28） 
Government savings 
 
∑ - + - - =
h
h TGR E TGF TGH PINDEX CTG YG STG * *                (29 )   
wherein STG is government savings 
 
Other demand function 
 
Figure  2  shows  the  structure  of  demand  in  the  model.  Total  domestic  demand  includes 
household  consumption,  government  consumption,  intermediate  inputs  demand,  and  investment 
demand.  Consumption  functions  for  different  agents  (household  and  government)  have  been 
discussed as above, as well as the intermediate inputs demand equation. Investment demand is 
simply defined as a portion of total output. 
On the other hand, from the supply side of these demand points of view, total demand is 
sourced from domestically produced goods and imported goods. 
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In which, Ci: total consumption demand 
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Investment demand function 
 
i i i PC IT DI / * v =                                           (32) 
 
In which, DIi: investment demand 
  i v : Share of investment in total investment
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In which, IMi:  import  
                Di:  Total demand 
            PMi: import price 
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Price block  
 
Import price 
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 Export price 
E PWE te PE i i i * ) 1 ( * = +                                               (36) 
 
Value-added  price 
j
j
jir ir ir ir ir PC ICJ XS P VA PVA * * * ∑ - =           (37) 
Sales price 
i i i i i i EX PE D PD XST PT * * * + =                          (38) 
 
Production cost 
ir ir ir ir ir ir LD W VA PVA KT RR * * * - =                        (39) 
 
Wage  
ir r ir r i i LDNQ WNQ LDQ WQ LD W * * * + =                              (40) 
 
Consumer price 






va PVA pindex ∑∑ = b                                                     (42) 
 
General equilibrium and model closure  
 
Equilibrium in goods market 
 
Total demand=goods supplied by domestic market + goods supplied by importation 
   
i i i i INV INTD C Q + + =                                               (43) 
 
Equilibrium in factor market 
 
Total unskilled labor demand =total unskilled labor supply 
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   r ir LSNQ LDNQ = ∑                                    (44) 
Where,  r LSNQ  is total unskilled labor supply 
 
Total skilled labor demand =total skilled labor supply 
 
r ir LSQ LDQ = ∑                                                  (45) 
Where,  r LSQ  is total skilled labor supply 
 
Capital demand =capital supply 
ir ir KT KT 0 =                                                    (46) 
 
Equilibrium in investment and savings 
  
CAB E STG SF SH IT
h
h * + + + =∑                           (47) 
 






i i EX PWE TRG TRF TRH IM PWM TGR TFR CAB * * ∑ ∑ ∑ - - - + + + =                         (48) 
wherein  CAB: Balance of trade 
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Appendix 2: Data and parameters 
 
Source of the SAM 
As in any general equilibrium model applied, the main database used is the Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM). SAM for eastern China, western China and the rest of China in this project is based 
on “China’s multi-regional input-output table”
15 published in 2005. The structure of the I-O table is in 
table 11. Our aim in applying this I-O table is to get a standard SAM (see Table 12) that can be 
used in our CGE model.  
Table 11: China’s multi-regional I-O table 
  Intermediate demand 
Region 1……..Region 8 
Final 
demand 






    . 
Region  8 
                 
Value-added               
Total input             
Table 12: SAM structure in the 3-region CGE model for China  
                                               Expenditures 
Receipts  factors  household  Firm  government  the rest of 
the world 
activity  commodity  investment Total 
factors            Value-
added 
    Factor 
income 
household  Labour 
income 
    Government 
transfer 
        Household 
income 
firm  Capital 
income 
to firm 
              Firm 
income 
government    Income tax        Indirect tax  tariff    governme
nt 
income 
the rest of 
the world 
            imports    imports 
activity              Domestic 
supply, 
export supply 
  Total sales 
commodity    Household 
consumptio
n 





  investment Total 
domestic 
sales 








      Total 
savings 
                                                            
15 See  China  Information  Centre  (2005),  “Multi-regional  Input-output  Model  for  China”,  Social  Sciences 
Academic Press. China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) began to compile national income accounts from 
1952 to 1984 according to Material Product System (MPS). From 1985 to 1992, national accounts featured 
the coexistence of MPS and the System of National Accounts (SNA). Since 1993, the SNA has been the sole 
basis for the national accounts system. Every five years the NBS publishes a new I-O table. Although it was 
not really a SAM according to an SNA system in developed countries, it was very similar and was thus able to 
serve the purpose of the study.   31

















Source of the elasticity 
Elasticity  of  the  substitution  in  the  model  includes  elasticity  of  substitution  between  primary 
factors, and elasticity of transformation between domestic sales and exports. The best way to get 
the elasticity is to estimate it using either an econometric approach or a “validation” procedure. To 
make the work easier and reasonable, the authors will borrow these elasticities directly from the 
GTAP database, or otherwise estimate these by themselves. Besides some elasticity, and before 
solving the CGE model, a so-called parameter calibration procedure must be undertaken so that the 
values of some key parameters (except elasticity of substitution) are directly calculated from the 
model’s equilibrium conditions. Such a methodology is widely used in CGE models. Further, we use 
equilibrium data to find the values of the share and scale parameters in the production functions and 
CET function, as well as parameters in the LES functions.  
 Source to classify household 
It is clear that data on households’ behavior is crucial in analyzing the impact of policies on 
income distribution and poverty. We draw data for this issue directly from the “Multi-regional I-O 
Model for China” to disaggregate households into two different groups in each region (one group is 
for the rural area and another group is for the urban area)
16. 
                                                            
16 Actually, in the China Statistical Yearbook, NBS classifies 7 groups of urban households and 5 groups of 
rural households. 